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UNIFYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
FREE EXERCISE, THE PROVISION OF SUBSIDIES,
AND A PUBLIC FORUM EQUIVALENT
INTRODUCTION
The problem with constructing categories of thought is that doing so
causes one to ignore the interrelationships between the categories that
one constructs.1 For instance, the respective precedents of the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses have developed separately over
time and have diverged, especially with respect to the provision of
subsidies. 2 In the free speech arena, the law of public subsidies is
more permissive than the law of regulation, in certain contexts.3 As
discussed below, the same is not true in the area of free exercise. 4 In
deciding Locke v. Davey,5 the United States Supreme Court had the
opportunity to check the premises from which it was operating in or-
der to return a measure of consistency to these related categories of
constitutional law.6
The majority opinion in Locke represented an attempt by the Court
to do just that-to align free speech and free exercise case law as they
relate to the provision of subsidies. In Locke, the State of Washington
revoked a Promise Scholarship that it had given to Joshua Davey after
it became aware that Davey decided to major in devotional theology.
The Locke majority implicitly incorporated the analysis pervasive in
free speech case law wherein the Court affords greater deference to
governmental decisionmaking when it involves the provision of subsi-
1. Noted constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky made this point in a speech at DePaul
University College of Law (Apr. 1, 2004).
2. Throughout this article, use of the term "subsidies" will be in reference to federal or state
government expenditures.
3. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (re-
jecting the "notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are
subsidized by the State" (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959))). See
also infra notes 59-81 and accompanying text. Throughout this article, the term "regulation"
refers to the outright prohibition by government of certain activities.
4. The First Amendment of the Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
5. Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
6. They are related because both are First Amendment clauses phrased in nearly identical
language.
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dies.7 The inclination to synchronize the two bodies of law is proper,
as the two clauses are so similar in structure. 8 Nonetheless, the ulti-
mate result reached by the Locke majority is legally incorrect when
one considers the body of First Amendment jurisprudence in its en-
tirety. Instead, the Washington Promise Scholarship Program cannot
satisfy strict scrutiny and must fail. Analogizing to the body of free
speech subsidy law necessarily compels a consideration of the facts
underlying Locke using a framework resembling the free speech pub-
lic forum analysis.
Part II of this Note gives a brief overview of the school subsidy
movement and constitutional case law that is relevant to it.9 Part III
will argue for applying the Free Speech Clause concept of a public
forum in the Free Exercise Clause analysis of school subsidy pro-
grams. 10 Part IV will consider the possible ramifications of the Locke
decision for other variations of school subsidy programs." Part V
concludes that applying a free speech public forum analysis to the
Free Exercise Clause would bring consistency to the First Amendment
treatment of subsidies. 12
II. BACKGROUND
This section addresses the state of the law regarding content-based
restrictions on school voucher programs. First, this section discusses
the genesis and growth of the school voucher movement. This section
also discusses Supreme Court case law concerning the Establishment
Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Free Exercise Clause in rela-
tion to the provision of subsidies. 13 Finally, this section details the
case of Locke v. Davey.
7. See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation
of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
8. See infra notes 221-224 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 13-154 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 155-308 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 309-358 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 359-361 and accompanying text.
13. When a government subsidy program implicates religious belief or religious speech, it
raises concern under not only the Free Speech Clause but also the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause. See generally Vernadette Ramirez Broyles, The Faith-Based Initiative,
Charitable Choice, and Protecting the Free Speech Rights of Faith-Based Organizations, 26 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 315 (2003).
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A. Recent History of the School Voucher Movement
Professor Milton Friedman, who first used the term "voucher" in
this context in a 1955 article,' 4 often receives credit for the idea be-
hind the school choice movement. 15 He argued that the system of
public funding for schools should be opened to private schools, in or-
der to further the interests of competition and economic efficiency. 16
The notion did not truly gain momentum, however, until the late
1980s.1 7 Supporters saw vouchers as an opportunity to alleviate the
deteriorating state of education in many American inner cities.' 8 To-
day, several states have enacted a school choice program in one form
or another.' 9
In recent years, school subsidy programs have become a national
issue. President George W. Bush made school choice a salient feature
of his party's platform during the 2000 presidential election. 20 After
promoting the initiative in his legislative agenda, the President
achieved recent success when the House and Senate both passed an
appropriations bill that included fourteen million dollars a year for
private school tuition grants to schoolchildren in the District of Co-
lumbia.21 As a result, the federal government will now subsidize pri-
vate schools for the first time. Since school subsidy programs most
often include the allocation of funds to religious schools, the programs
14. Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 123, 127 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955). Friedman argued that the government could
"require a minimum level of education which they could finance by giving parents vouchers
redeemable for a specified maximum sum per child per year if spent on 'approved' educational
services." Id.
15. Joseph P. Viteritti, School Choice: The Threshold Question, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 251, 252
(2001).
16. Id.
17. See JOSEPH P. VITERITrI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND CIVIL SOCIETY 57 (1999) (noting that President Ronald Reagan submitted voucher bills to
Congress in 1983, 1985, and 1986).
18. See Mary Mitchell, A Path Out of Black Males' Crisis: School Choice, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Oct. 21, 2003, at 14 (stating that "if public schools aren't good enough for the children of politi-
cians like Dick Durbin, Jesse Jackson and members of the state and national teachers union, why
are they good enough for poor black children?") (quoting Chicago Defender advertisement).
19. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124D.03 (West 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-238, 79-241,
79-605 (Michie 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.38 (West 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313
(Anderson 2003).
20. See Party Platform, Section Three, Education and Opportunity: Leave No American Be-
hind (2000), at http://www.rnc.org/About/PartyPlatform/default.aspx?Section=3 (pledging sup-
port for then-Governor Bush's education reform policies, which would "[aissist states in closing
the achievement gap and empower needy families to escape persistently failing schools by al-
lowing federal dollars to follow their children to the school of their choice").
21. See Spencer S. Hsu & Justin Blum, D.C. School Vouchers Win Final Approval, WASH.
POST, Jan. 23, 2004, at A2.
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inherently raise questions regarding government's favor or disfavor of
religion under the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause.22
B. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
A statute that facially implicates religion raises concern under both
religion clauses of the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment, which has been applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 23 provides that, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion .... ",24 As Dean Kathleen
Sullivan of Stanford Law School suggests, "Establishment Clause con-
troversies do not arise today over flagrant examples of clearly forbid-
den official sectarianism. '25 Instead, today's Establishment Clause
concerns tend to be much more nuanced, requiring a careful examina-
tion of the appropriate kind and amount of support the federal and
state governments may provide to religious institutions.
26
1. State Preference of One Religion over Another
In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the receipt of state
funds by religious institutions if the schools receive the funding
through a neutral government program that distributes aid to groups
or citizens without reference to religion.2 7 An important element con-
22. See Colleen Carlton Smith, Note, Zelman's Evolving Legacy: Selective Funding of Secular
Private Schools in State School Choice Programs, 89 VA. L. REV. 1953, 1968-69 (2003). Smith
argues that both clauses might limit the flexibility of state decision makers in fashioning such
programs:
In the Establishment Clause context, states may be accused of crafting school choice
programs that promote secularism, thereby establishing nonreligion. On the Free Exer-
cise side of the equation, however, states may be accused of selectively excluding relig-
ious schools, thereby impermissibly burdening religious liberty.
Id.
23. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (stating that "[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such
laws.").
24. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
25. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAw. L. REV. 449, 451
(2000).
26. Id.
27. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding, against a First Amendment
challenge, reimbursements to parents for their children's transportation expenses to both public
and private schools); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a Minnesota statute al-
lowing parents limited tax deductions on the tuition and transportation expenses incurred in
sending their children to nonpublic schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993) (upholding the provision of a language interpreter by the local school district to a student
attending Catholic school); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995) (holding that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit inclusion of an otherwise eligible
[Vol. 54:157
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sistent throughout these cases is that the programs channel govern-
mental funding through a private intermediary, which then allocates
the money as a matter of individual choice.28
A more basic and longer established principle of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence maintains that a state may not by law favor one
religion or religious belief over another.29 Over the years, the Court
has reinforced this principle in a series of cases. First, in the two fol-
lowing cases, the Court reversed state actions under statutes that re-
sulted in the disparate treatment of different religious groups.
a. Niemotko v. Maryland and Fowler v. Rhode Island
The Court began to develop the principle that government must af-
ford equal treatment to religious groups with two cases in the early
1950s. The first, Niemotko v. Maryland,30 involved a group of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses that held a religious meeting in a public park without
a permit.31 The city had no formal requirements or standards gov-
erning the issuance of the permit. 32 Following the city's customary
practice, however, the group requested permission to use the park
from the Park Commissioner. 33 The Commissioner refused.34 The
group then filed a written request with the City Council, but again its
request was denied. 35 After the group held its meeting without a per-
mit, two of the group's leaders were arrested and convicted of disor-
derly conduct.36 After the appellate court declined to review the
conviction, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the trial
court's decision.37 The Court took issue with the particulars of the
system and found it to be a prior restraint on the freedoms of speech
and religion.38 Writing for the Court, Justice Frederick Vinson found
evangelical Christian magazine in a student activities program funded with mandatory student
fees).
28. See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 740 (1976) (upholding a state grant pro-
gram, MD. ANN. CODE, art. 77A, §§ 65-69 (1975), that awarded annual grants to private col-
leges, even if religiously affiliated, on the understanding that the funds would not be used for
sectarian purposes); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding a statute, N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 791 (1967), that required the state to distribute free secular textbooks to all schoolchild-
ren in both public and private schools).
29. See infra notes 30-53 and accompanying text.
30. 340 U.S. 268 (1951).




35. Id. at 270.
36. Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 270.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 273. A prior restraint is when the government stops activity before it occurs.
2004]
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that the reason why local officials denied the Jehovah's Witnesses a
permit was because local officials disliked the population and their
views.39 Such discrimination was necessarily barred by the religion
clauses of the First Amendment. 40
Similarly, in Fowler v. Rhode Island,41 the police arrested a Jeho-
vah's Witness minister for speaking at a religious meeting in a public
park, which violated a city ordinance.42 In application, the ordinance
protected the church services of Catholics and Protestants in the same
park. 43 The Court found that fact fatal, saying the ordinance "plainly
shows that a religious service of Jehovah's Witnesses is treated differ-
ently than a religious service of other sects. That amounts to the state
preferring some religious groups over this one."'44 For Rhode Island
officials to interpret the statute in this asymmetrical way manifested a
serious contravention of governmental authority. The Court stated:
[I]t is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice or
activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the
First Amendment. Nor is it in the competence of courts under our
constitutional scheme to approve, disapprove, classify, regulate, or
in any manner control sermons delivered at religious meetings. Ser-
mons are as much a part of a religious service as prayers. They
cover a wide range and have as great a diversity as the Bible or
other Holy Book from which they commonly take their texts. To
call the words which one minister speaks to his congregation a ser-
mon, immune from regulation, and the words of another minister an
address, subject to regulation, is merely an indirect way of prefer-
ring one religion over another.45
By applying the statute in such a way as to prefer certain religions
over others, the state violated the religion clauses of the First
Amendment. 46
39. Id. at 272.
40. Id.
41. 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
42. Id. at 67. The ordinance provided that:
No person shall address any political or religious meeting in any public park; but this
section shall not be construed to prohibit any political or religious club or society from
visiting any public park in a body, provided that.no public address shall be made under
the auspices of such club or society in such park.
Id.
43. Id. at 67-68.
44. Id. at 69.
45. Id. at 70.
46. Fowler, 345 U.S. at 70.
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b. Epperson v. Arkansas
In a later case, Epperson v. Arkansas,47 the Court extended the
principle requiring the equal treatment of disparate religious groups,
developed in Niemotko and Fowler, to require the equal treatment by
government of disparate religious beliefs. 48 In Epperson, the Court
invalidated an Arkansas law that prohibited teachers in public schools
from teaching the theory of evolution. 49 The law violated the Estab-
lishment Clause by giving primacy to one religious belief-the Chris-
tian understanding of creationism-over all others.50 Writing for a
unanimous court, Justice Abe Fortas indicated that government
must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and prac-
tice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-
religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or relig-
ious theory against another or even against the militant opposite.
The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between
religion and religion .... 51
Finding this prohibition "absolute," the Court declared that the states
may not adopt programs that aid or prefer one religious belief over
another.5 2 In short, the Court in Epperson expanded the reasoning it
developed in Niemotko and Fowler to prohibit the differential treat-
ment by government of disparate religious beliefs.
Thus, the Establishment Clause provides that government must ex-
tend equal treatment both to disparate religious groups and religious
beliefs. Often, in cases that address issues of religious speech, courts
must balance the demands of the Establishment Clause with individ-
ual rights under the Free Speech Clause. 53
C. Free Speech Clause Jurisprudence
Also pertinent to the constitutionality of school subsidy programs
are a series of free speech cases. The First Amendment to the Consti-
tution proclaims that, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
47. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
48. Id. at 104 (stating that "[tihe First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality be-
tween religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion") (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 109. The statute made it unlawful for any teacher "to teach the theory or doctrine
that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals." Id. at 98-99.
50. Id. at 107-09.
51. Id. at 103-04.
52. Id. at 106.
53. See Timothy K. Hall, Note, Constitutional Conflict: The Establishment Clause Meets the
Free Speech Clause in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 45 MER-
CER L. REV. 875, 877 (1994) (stating that "a potential conflict exists between the Establishment




freedom of speech."'54 Although the language of the Amendment it-
self is extremely broad, the Court has continuously held that free
speech is not absolute. 55 However, the Court has given the Free
Speech Clause great weight in the context of preventing both the fed-
eral and state governments from proscribing speech on the basis of its
content or viewpoint,56 a principle that has been evident since the
Court first began expanding First Amendment freedoms in the early
twentieth century. A more recent jurisprudential development is the
Court's treatment of restrictions on free speech in conjunction with
subsidy programs.57 Even in the following free speech subsidy cases,
however, where the Court exhibited considerable deference toward
governmental decisionmaking, the Court continued to scrutinize more
closely those laws that contained viewpoint discrimination. 58
1. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington
Beginning in the early 1980s, the Court began to demonstrate great
deference to governmental decisionmaking within a subsidy program.
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,59 for in-
stance, the Treasury Department denied tax-exempt status to Taxation
With Representation of Washington (TWR), a nonprofit organiza-
tion.60 The Internal Revenue Code provision allowed charity organi-
zations to claim a tax exemption, 61 but prohibited groups engaged in
substantial lobbying, such as TWR, from doing so. 62 Justice William
Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that TWR could
continue to receive the benefit if it separated its lobbying function
from its charity function by setting up two distinct organizations. 63
54. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment was incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment to bind the states beginning with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
55. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (stating that "[tihe most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and caus-
ing a panic"); Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.").
56. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959) (holding that a state
may not deny a license to a film because it advocates adultery and finding that the "First Amend-
ment's basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas"); Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (holding that a city may not proscribe por-
nography subordinating women while allowing for other types of pornography).
57. See infra notes 59-95 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 68 and 81 and accompanying text.
59. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
60. Id. at 542.
61. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
62. Regan, 461 U.S. at 544.
63. Id.
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The constitutionality of the provision turned on whether compelling
this separation of functions "penaliz[ed]" TWR for lobbying.64 Be-
cause the provision did not deny TWR the right to receive support for
its non-lobbying activities, but only refused to fund lobbying, the
Court upheld the statute. 65
The tax provision represented Congress's choice to confer a benefit
upon one activity to the exclusion of another. 66 In supporting Con-
gress's ability to subsidize one activity over another, the Court ex-
plained that "although government may not place obstacles in the
path of a [person's] exercise of ... freedom of [speech], it need not
remove those not of its own creation. '67 The Court stated, however,
that "[tihe case would be different if Congress were to discriminate
invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to 'aim[] at the suppres-
sion of dangerous ideas." 68 While the Court demonstrated that it
would be deferential toward governmental decisionmaking involving
the provision of subsidies, it reserved the right to scrutinize more
closely subsidy laws that contained viewpoint discrimination.69 The
Court continued to demonstrate its deference in the following case.
2. Rust v. Sullivan
Extending the principle enunciated in Regan, the Court later dis-
played the same deference to the government's subsidy choices in a
major abortion funding decision. In Rust v. Sullivan,70 the Court up-
held regulations limiting the ability of federal funding recipients to
engage in abortion-related activities, such as counseling. 71 Under the
regulations, a Title X project generally could not promote the use of
abortion as a method of family planning.72 The Court reasoned that
64. Id. at 545. TWR lobbied for what its membership considered to be "the 'public interest' in
the area of federal taxation." Id. at 541.
65. Id. at 546 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959)) (holding that the First
Amendment did not require Congress to subsidize lobbying).
66. Id. at 548-49.
67. Id. at 549-50 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)). Prior to Harris, the Court
decided Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). Both cases laid the groundwork for the Court's
deferential approach to conditions placed on government funding within the free speech context.
A "condition" refers to a restriction that the government places on the dispersal of funds from a
subsidy program.
68. Regan, 461 U.S. at 548 (citing Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513 (quoting Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958))).
69. See id. at 549 (stating that most governmental subsidy decisions are "a matter of policy
and discretion not open to judicial review").
70. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
71. Id. at 178.
72. Id. at 180. Title X of the Public Health Services Act provides federal funding for family
planning services. Id. at 178.
2004]
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the Government is "entitled to define the limits of" a program that it
subsidizes. 73 As such, the Government was "not denying a benefit to
anyone, but [was] instead simply insisting that public funds be spent
for the purposes for which they were authorized. ' 74 As a result, the
condition could not be considered a "penalty" on speech, and was
therefore upheld under minimal scrutiny. 75 The decision in Rust
served to reinforce the Court's position that the government has a
discretionary right not to fund certain activities.76
3. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley
The Court has generally maintained a deferential posture through-
out free speech subsidy cases, but has also evidenced a willingness to
forgo deference where viewpoint discrimination is present. In Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,77 the Court upheld a provi-
sion of the National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities Act 78
against a free speech challenge. The provision required that the Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts "consider[ ] general standards of de-
cency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public" in determining which projects should receive federal fund-
ing.79 Respondents argued that the provision constituted facial view-
point discrimination because it rejected any artistic speech that failed
to respect mainstream values or offended conventional notions of de-
cency. 80 Although the Court disagreed, finding the provision facially
valid, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor expressed the majority's view
that the provision could be unconstitutional in application because
"even in the provision of subsidies, the government may not 'aim[ ] at
the suppression of dangerous ideas."' 81
4. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia
Twice in the 1990s the Court abandoned its deferential posture in
the face of viewpoint discrimination. In one of those cases, Rosenber-
73. Id. at 194.
74. Id. at 196.
75. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
76. Id. at 194 (explaining that "[t]o hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates
on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain per-
missible goals, because the program in advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative
goals, would render numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect").
77. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
78. Id. at 572 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 954 (2000)).
79. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (2000)).
80. Id. at 580.
81. Id. at 587 (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 550). See also supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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ger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,82 a University of Vir-
ginia program paid for the printing costs of student-run publications
out of the general student activities fund. The University decided to
withhold funding for one particular student newspaper because it
"'primarily promote[d] or manifest[ed] a particular belief in or about
a deity or an ultimate reality." 8 3 The students challenged the Univer-
sity's decision, claiming that the exclusion of their theological view-
point was a violation of their freedom of speech. The Court held that,
by adopting a generally available funding program for the purpose of
supporting private student speech, the University created a "meta-
physical" public forum that prevented it from denying access to stu-
dent organizations based on the content or viewpoint of the students'
expression.8 4 Interestingly, the Court also rejected the University's
argument that the central issue was not the denial of access to facili-
ties, but rather the permissible denial of funding.85 In Rosenberger,
then, the Court enunciated its position that the exclusion of a religious
group from a state-run program on the basis of the group's religious
beliefs constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 86
5. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District
Today's Court has buttressed the position that the exclusion of re-
ligious speech on the basis of its religious content comprises viewpoint
discrimination in violation of the Constitution. In Lamb's Chapel,
87
for instance, a local school board issued rules and regulations for the
use of school property, including one providing that "'the school
premises shall not be used by any group for religious purposes."' 88
The school district then denied a church access to school premises to
exhibit for public viewing a film series that dealt with family issues
from a religious perspective. 89
82. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
83. Id. at 825 (internal citation omitted).
84. Id. at 830.
85. Id. at 832-35. Had the issue been merely the denial of funding, then the Court might have
been more deferential, as it had in Regan and Rust.
86. Id. at 835 (declaring that "[t]he government cannot justify viewpoint discrimination among
private speakers on the economic fact of scarcity").
87. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
88. Id. at 387 (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 388-89. The films showed lectures by Doctor James Dobson, a licensed psycholo-
gist, professor, author, and radio commentator. Id. at 388. The lectures addressed topics such as
parenting, conflicts in marriage, parent/child relationships, and family values. Id. at 387-88.
They generally addressed the undermining influences in today's culture, which "could only be




After finding that the state had created a limited public forum, the
Court contemplated whether the state's exclusion of that category of
speech was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The Court held that the
exclusion constituted viewpoint discrimination because the church was
denied access solely because "the presentation would have been from
a religious perspective." 90 The film series dealt with a subject that was
otherwise permissible, but was excluded because it dealt with that sub-
ject from a religious standpoint. 91 The Court found this to be view-
point discrimination and, therefore, the state was required to justify its
regulation with a compelling state interest.92 Rejecting the state's ar-
gument that its interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation
was a compelling one, the Court declared that, "there would have
been no realistic danger that the community would think that the Dis-
trict was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any benefit to
religion or to the Church would have been no more than incidental. '93
Thus, the state could not justify its viewpoint discrimination, and the
Court declared the state action unconstitutional. 94
Subsidy programs that affect religious speech raise concern under
both the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Gener-
ally, the program may discriminate against religion, thereby violating
the Free Exercise Clause as well as the Free Speech Clause "as a form
of viewpoint discrimination against religion. '95
D. Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence
A statute that facially implicates religion necessarily raises concerns
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Free
Exercise Clause, extended to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment, provides that, "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
... 96 Again, Dean Kathleen Sullivan notes that "free exercise con-
troversies rarely arise from the overt suppression of religious prac-
tices. Catholics are no longer tarred and feathered by angry mobs nor
90. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94.
91. Id. at 394.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 395.
94. Id. at 397.
95. Rita-Anne O'Neill, Note, The School Voucher Debate After Zelman: Can States Be Com-
pelled to Fund Sectarian Schools Under the Federal Constitution?, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1397, 1399 n.8
(2003).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
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Mormons driven over mountains into exile."'97 As evident in the fol-
lowing cases, most controversies are not as straightforward.
1. Cantwell v. Connecticut
One of the early free exercise cases, Cantwell v. Connecticut,98 fur-
ther developed the general distinction between religious belief and re-
ligious action that the Court had previously announced. 99 In Cantwell,
three Jehovah's Witnesses went door to door selling books on relig-
ious subjects and soliciting contributions.'00 The three men were ar-
rested and ultimately convicted under a state statute that prohibited
the solicitation of money for religious causes.' 0 ' The State Supreme
Court upheld the convictions, and held that the statute was constitu-
tional as "an effort by the State to protect the public against fraud and
imposition in the solicitation of funds for what purported to be relig-
ious, charitable, or philanthropic causes.' 10 2
Upon review by the United States Supreme Court, Justice Owen
Roberts defined the scope of the First Amendment as "embrac[ing]
two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society."'1 °3 While
97. Sullivan, supra note 25, at 451.
98. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
99. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Court upheld a federal law making
bigamy a crime in the territories as applied to convict a Mormon man who claimed that polyg-
amy was his religious duty. In upholding the statute, the Court announced a general distinction
between religious beliefs, which were immune from regulation, and actions, which could be regu-
lated or proscribed altogether. Id. at 166. In Justice Morrison Waite's words, "[l]aws are made
for the government of actions, and while [the state] cannot interfere with mere religious belief
and opinions, they may with practices." Id. Applying this distinction to the facts of the case, the
Court found that the man could not cite his religious belief to avoid prosecution for the crime
because to do so would, "permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." Id. at 166-67.
100. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 301.
101. The statute stated:
No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable thing for any al-
leged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, from other than a member of the
organization for whose benefit such person is soliciting or within the county in which
such person or organization is located unless such cause shall have been approved by
the secretary of the public welfare council. Upon application of any person in behalf of
such cause, the secretary shall determine whether such cause is a religious one or is a
bona fide object of charity or philanthropy and conforms to reasonable standards of
efficiency and integrity, and, if he shall so find, shall approve the same and issue to the
authority in charge a certificate to that effect. Such certificate may be revoked at any
time. Any person violating any provision of this section shall be fined not more than
one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days or both.
Id. at 301-02.
102. Id. at 302.
103. Id. at 303-04.
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it would be permissible for the State to prohibit solicitation generally,
the Court took issue with the particulars of the system, which vested
authority in the Secretary of the Public Welfare Council. 10 4 If he de-
termined that a cause was religious in nature, he could withhold his
approval for the issuance of a license. 105 As a result, the Court found
that
to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious
views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exer-
cise of a determination by state authority as to what is a religious
cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty pro-
tected by the Constitution.10 6
Under the Court's reasoning in Cantwell, the government generally
may not interfere in matters of religious belief,10 7 so that "many dif-
ferent types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop un-
molested and unobstructed.' ' 0 8
2. United States v. Ballard
Four years later, in United States v. Ballard,10 9 the Court asserted
that the government may not punish citizens' expression of religious
belief that it finds to be false. 110 In that case, the defendants were
charged with mail fraud after sending letters to individuals soliciting
both money and participation in their religion.' The jury convicted
the defendants after the trial judge instructed the jury that it was only
to determine whether the defendants had a good faith belief in their
religious convictions, and not to determine the truth of any of the de-
fendants' religious beliefs."12 The Court upheld the instruction with-
holding from the jury questions of the truth of religious beliefs,
emphasizing that "[m]an's relation to his God was made no concern of
the state. He was granted the right to worship as he pleased and to
answer to no man for the verity of his religious views. 11 3 The Court
maintained its principle that the government cannot intrude into mat-
ters of religious belief.
104. Id. at 305-06.
105. Id. at 305.
106. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307.
107. Id. at 303.
108. Id. at 310.
109. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
110. Id. at 88.
111. Id. at 79.
112. Id. at 81.
113. Id. at 86-87.
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3. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah
Finally, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,' 14
the Court held that a Florida city ordinance prohibiting animal sacri-
fice contravened the Free Exercise Clause. 1 5 Writing for the Court,
Justice Anthony Kennedy reasoned that since the ordinance was
neither neutral nor of general application, and was not passed to pro-
tect a compelling government interest, it could not pass constitutional
muster.1 16 The way that Florida officials interpreted and applied the
statute clearly evidenced a purpose to burden a single religious
faith. 117 Finding that the city passed the ordinance with this specific
church in mind, Justice Kennedy noted, "if the object of a law is to
infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motiva-
tion, the law is not neutral."'118 The Court found that although the law
was not facially discriminatory, it constituted covert suppression of
particular religious beliefs.' 19 Taken together, Cantwell, Ballard, and
Lukumi represent the principle that, under the Free Exercise Clause,
state governments may not compel adherence to a certain religious
belief.120
The following principles were known to the Supreme Court before
it heard Locke v. Davey. First, the Establishment Clause requires
government to provide equal treatment to disparate religious groups
and religions.1 21  Second, under the Free Speech Clause, the Court
will demonstrate great deference toward government subsidy deci-
sions, unless those decisions include some form of viewpoint discrimi-
nation. 2 2 Third, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from
intruding into personal matters of religious belief.123 It was unclear at
the time how the Court would reconcile these somewhat conflicting
principles.
114. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
115. Id. at 547.
116. Id. at 546-47.
117. Id. at 542. The ordinance was directed at practitioners of the Santeria faith, who regu-
larly engaged in the ritual of animal sacrifice. The court determined that the "ordinances 'ha[ve]
every appearance of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worship-
pers] but not upon itself.' This precise evil is what the requirement of general applicability is
designed to prevent." Id. at 545-46 (citation omitted).
118. Id. at 533.
119. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542.
120. See also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (invalidating a provision of the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights that required all holders of public office to declare their belief in the
existence of God).
121. See supra notes 23-53 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 54-95 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
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E. Subject Opinion: Locke v. Davey
The Court encountered facts in Locke v. Davey that required it to
apply these precedents to the State of Washington's school subsidy
program. Washington awarded Joshua Davey a "Promise Scholar-
ship" under a program whereby the state partially funded higher edu-
cation for qualified students.12 4 To be eligible, the student must
graduate in the top fifteen percent of her high school class, have a
family income that is equal to or less than 135 percent of the state's
median, and attend an accredited public or private university, college
or other accredited post-secondary institution in the state of Washing-
ton.125 Davey was selected for the Scholarship and enrolled at North-
west College, an accredited institution affiliated with the Assemblies
of God.126 Davey, intending to become a cleric, declared a double
major in Pastoral Ministries and Business Management and Adminis-
tration. 127 The Pastoral Ministries major is designed to prepare stu-
dents for a career as a Christian minister, and consists of classes taught
from the viewpoint that the Bible represents truth.128
The Washington Constitution reads: "No public money or property
shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise
or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment .... -129
The Washington enabling statute provides that "no aid shall be
awarded to any student who is pursuing a degree in theology." 130
Northwest College "determined that majors in Pastoral Ministries are
pursuing a degree in theology, so it could not certify Davey's eligibil-
ity.' '131 As a result, Davey had to choose between foregoing the schol-
arship money available to him and continuing in his chosen course of
studies.132 He decided to pursue his chosen major and, consequently,
he did not receive scholarship funds.133
Davey sued the state, claiming that Washington's statutory and con-
stitutional prohibitions on the use of state funds for religious instruc-
tion violate the rights of free exercise and free speech guaranteed by
the Washington Constitution, as well as his rights under the Federal
124. Davey v. Locke, No. COO-61R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *2-3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5,
2000).
125. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310 (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12) (2004)).
126. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 2002).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310 (citing WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 11 (2002)).
130. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.10.814 (West Supp. 1997)).
131. Davey, 299 F.3d at 751.
132. Id.
133. Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *4.
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Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses.1 34 The state
defended on the ground that it did not prohibit Davey from pursuing
religious studies but simply declined to fund them. The state also as-
serted that funding for religious instruction is barred by state law and
the state constitutional provision regarding the separation of church
and state. Finally, the state contended that refusing to award aid to
students pursuing a degree in theology is reasonably related to the bar
in the Washington Constitution. Both parties moved for summary
judgment, which the district court granted in the state's favor.135 Da-
vey appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. 136 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals overruled the dis-
trict court, holding that the state policy denying a Promise Scholarship
to an otherwise qualified student simply because he decides to pursue
a degree in theology infringes upon his federal right to the free exer-
cise of religion.137
The Supreme Court granted certiorari1 38 and reversed the Ninth
Circuit's ruling. Since the Court had only in 2002 held that school
subsidies were constitutional, the question of whether a state could
place conditions on those subsidies was one of first impression. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, determined that the state
program of scholarship assistance, which prohibited the use of schol-
arships for the pursuit of degrees in devotional theology, did not vio-
late the Free Exercise Clause. 139 The Court rejected Davey's
argument that the statute was presumptively unconstitutional because
it was not facially neutral with respect to religion. Instead the Court
reasoned that the state's disfavor of religion
is of a far milder kind. It imposes neither criminal nor civil sanc-
tions on any type of religious service or rite. It does not deny to
ministers the right to participate in the political affairs of the com-
munity. And it does not require students to choose between their
religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit. The State has
merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.140
The Court also rejected the view advocated by the dissent that gener-
ally available benefits constitute "part of the baseline against which
burdens on religion are measured, ' 141 and found that the scholarships
134. Id.
135. Id. at *26.
136. Davey, 299 F.3d at 752.
137. Id. at 760.
138. Locke v. Davey, 538 U.S. 1031 (2003).
139. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1315.
140. Id. at 1312-13 (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority aptly summarized Justice Scalia's argu-
ment as follows: "Because the Promise Scholarship Program funds training for all secular profes-
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were generally available only for "training for secular professions"
and that "training for religious professions and training for secular
professions are not fungible."'1 42 Instead, the Court found that the
state was simply exercising its interest in avoiding an establishment of
religion by creating a formal prohibition against "using tax funds to
support the ministry."'1 43 In short, Justice Rehnquist placed this fact
scenario within the "play in the joints" between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, 144 and determined that allowing
students to use state scholarships to pursue a degree in devotional the-
ology was one of those "actions permitted by the Establishment
Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause."'1 45
Instead of finding evidence of the state's hostility toward religion,
the Court concluded that the state had demonstrated considerable ef-
fort to include religion-by permitting use of the scholarships at ac-
credited religious schools and even permitting students to take non-
devotional theology courses.146 The Court concluded that the "State's
interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial
and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden" 147
on the free exercise rights of those in Davey's position.
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented. He argued that the state violated
the Free Exercise Clause by excluding persons from benefits available
to all solely on the basis of religion.148 Deriding the standardless ma-
jority decision 149 and its novel "play in the joints" approach, 150 Justice
Scalia advocated an understanding of the religion clauses as demand-
ing neutrality and noted that Davey sought only equal treatment. 151
He further observed that the majority found no interest of the state to
sions, Justice Scalia contends the State must also fund training for religious professions." Id. at
1313.
142. Id. at 1313.
143. Id. at 1314.
144. Chief Justice Rehnquist used the term "play in the joints" to refer to instances involving
"state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise
Clause." Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311.
145. Id. at 1311.
146. Id. at 1314-15.
147. Id. at 1315.
148. Id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1318 (observing that "the [majority] opinion is devoid of any mention of standard
of review").
150. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1317 (discussing the majority's "principle of 'play in the joints'.... I
use the term 'principle' loosely, for that is not so much a legal principle as a refusal to apply any
principle when faced with competing constitutional directives.").
151. Id. at 1316-17.
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be compelling, and as a result, the state could not justify its facial dis-
crimination against religion. 152
Justice Clarence Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissent, but wrote
separately to indicate that, although the parties agreed for purposes of
litigation that a degree in theology means a degree that is "devotional
in nature or designed to induce religious faith," the Washington stat-
ute did not define "theology."' 153 Under the usual definition of the
term "theology," then, the statute could be understood to exclude
from eligibility those students who pursued "the study of theology
from a secular perspective as well [as those who studied theology]
from a religious one."'1 54
III. ANALYSIS
This section describes the ways in which the Supreme Court is grad-
ually coming to terms with school subsidy programs as constitutional
under the religion clauses of the First Amendment. It also suggests
that analogizing to free speech case law is useful in order to analyze
the constitutionality of school subsidy programs under the Free Exer-
cise Clause. In addition, this section argues for the development
under the Free Exercise Clause of a constitutional concept equivalent
to that of the public forum found in Free Speech Clause
jurisprudence.
A. A Court Coming to Terms with School Subsidies
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,155 the Court held that the provision
of school subsidies to religious schools did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause in certain circumstances. The Ohio legislature had en-
acted the Scholarship Program, among other initiatives, to remedy the
educational "crisis. ' 15 6 The Court upheld the government subsidy
program because it neutrally provided benefits to a broad class of citi-
zens defined without reference to religion, and the aid that ultimately
flowed to religious institutions did so as a result of the genuinely inde-
pendent choices of aid recipients. 57
The Zelman decision, however, left unanswered questions concern-
ing the types of conditions that states may impose on school subsidy
152. Id. at 1318.
153. Id. at 1320-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 1321.
155. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
156. Id. at 708.
157. Id. at 651.
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programs without violating the Constitution.1 58 Locke presented the
Court with precisely that issue for resolution.
1. School Subsidy Programs Generally Raise No Establishment
Clause Concerns
The majority and the dissenters in Locke agreed that the Federal
Establishment Clause would not prohibit Washington from permitting
students to apply a state scholarship toward their pursuit of a degree
in devotional theology.159 Moreover, even the State of Washington
did not argue before the Court that doing so would violate the Federal
Establishment Clause. 160 As such, the fact situation of Locke v. Da-
vey posed no Establishment Clause problem, 161 and instead raised
concerns under the Free Exercise Clause. 162
2. Is There a Role for Free Exercise in the School Subsidy Context?
The First Amendment issue remaining for the Court to consider in
Locke was the relationship between school subsidy programs and the
Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court decided the case on Da-
vey's free exercise claim alone, as the district court had rejected his
establishment and free speech claims, and the Ninth Circuit had ruled
for Davey solely on the basis of the Free Exercise Clause claim. 163
According to prevailing Free Exercise Clause precedent, the Court
is to apply strict scrutiny when reviewing any law that facially impli-
cates religion. 164 In deciding whether a law is constitutional under the
Free Exercise Clause, the Court "must begin with its text, for the min-
158. For instance, the Ohio statute challenged in Zelman included a provision stating that, as a
condition of receiving state funding, participating schools could not "teach hatred of any person
or group on the basis of... religion." Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3313.976(A)(6) (West 2003)). The majority opinion did not mention the provision. Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
159. See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311-12 (stating that "there is no doubt that the State could,
consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devo-
tional theology, . . . and the State does not contend otherwise.") (citations omitted); see also
Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1317 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing, noting that "[t]he establishment ques-
tion would not even be close").
160. Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected the state's argument, finding that "the proceeds (approxi-
mately $1,500 in Davey's year) may be used for any education-related expense, including food
and housing; application to religious instruction is remote at best." Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d
748, 760 (2002).
161. See id.
162. The Ninth Circuit held that for the state to deny Davey a Promise Scholarship for which
he was otherwise qualified solely because he decided to major in devotional theology infringed
his right to the free exercise of his religion. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 760 (9th Cir. 2002).
163. Davey, 299 F.3d at 760 (9th Cir. 2002).
164. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990) (stating that "[jiust as we subject
to the most exacting scrutiny laws that make classifications based on race ... so too we strictly
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imum requirement of neutrality is that a law must not discriminate on
its face."'1 65 Under the Court's free exercise jurisprudence, the fact
that the challenged law relates to the provision of subsidies is simply
irrelevant. The Court has, in numerous instances, applied strict scru-
tiny in holding that a state may not condition the availability of a ben-
efit on an individual's willingness to forgo conduct required by his
religion. 166 The Court's invocation of strict scrutiny does not bode
well for the challenged law, because a "law that targets religious con-
duct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental in-
terests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive
strict scrutiny only in rare cases."'1 67  t
For instance, in McDaniel v. Paty,168 a provision of the state consti-
tution provided that "no Minister of the Gospel, or priest of any de-
nomination whatever" could serve as a state legislator, and a similar
statute prohibited them from serving as delegates to the Tennessee
constitutional convention.1 69 After finding that the right to free exer-
cise encompassed the right to be a minister, the Supreme Court stated
that "McDaniel cannot exercise both rights simultaneously because
the State has conditioned the exercise of one on the surrender of the
other."1t 70 The Court applied strict scrutiny and found that the state's
bona fide purpose of attempting to separate church and state did not
justify its unconstitutional facial discrimination against religion.171
Likewise, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,172
the Court found that a Florida city ordinance prohibiting animal sacri-
fice contravened the Free Exercise Clause. 173 Writing for the Court,
Justice Kennedy reasoned that since the ordinance was neither neutral
nor of general application, strict scrutiny was appropriate. 174 The ap-
plication of the statute clearly evidenced a purpose to burden one re-
scrutinize governmental classifications based on religion"); see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 628 (1978).
165. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538, 565 (1993)
(stating that when "religious practice is being singled out for discriminatory treatment," the chal-
lenged government restriction must undergo the most "rigorous scrutiny").
166. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (asserting
that state laws burdening religious freedom "must be subjected to strict scrutiny and could be
justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest"); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
167. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
168. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
169. Id. at 621.
170. Id. at 626.
171. Id. at 628.
172. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
173. Id. at 547.
174. Id. at 546-47.
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ligious faith.175 Finding that the city passed the ordinance with this
specific church in mind, Justice Kennedy declared that the law was not
neutral.' 76 Moreover, it was a covert attempt to suppress particular
religious beliefs.' 77
As Justice Thomas noted, under established free exercise case law,
"Justice Scalia's application of our precedents is correct. '' 178 Justice
Scalia's dissent represented a sound legal treatment of these prece-
dents as they related to the facts in Locke. Since the law discrimi-
nated against religion on its face, he applied strict scrutiny and found
that the government failed to establish a compelling state interest to
justify its action.179 The only state interest he could locate was "a pure
philosophical preference: the state's opinion that it would violate tax-
payers' freedom of conscience not to discriminate against candidates
for the ministry.' 80 Since this interest was by no means compelling to
him, Justice Scalia would have invalidated the law. 81
Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in Locke was flawed because he
applied something less than strict scrutiny to a law that facially impli-
cated religion. 182 Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected Davey's argument
that the Washington statute was presumptively unconstitutional under
Lukumi because the statute was not sufficiently neutral with respect
to religion.183 To do so, he claimed, "would extend the Lukumi line of
cases well beyond not only their facts but their reasoning."'1 84 This
argument proves disingenuous, however, because there is no free ex-
ercise case upon which the Chief Justice can rely in order to demon-
strate that the Court should apply something less than strict scrutiny
175. Id. at 542. The ordinance was directed at practitioners of the Santeria faith, who engaged
in ritual animal sacrifice. Id. at 535. The court held that the "ordinances 'have every appearance
of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but not upon
itself.' This precise evil is what the requirement of general applicability is designed to prevent."
Id. at 545-46 (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
176. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
177. Id. at 542.
178. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1321 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. Id.
181. Justice Scalia argued that the state failed to justify the statute with a compelling interest,
as it must do under strict scrutiny. Id. The Court has suggested that the state's interest in avoid-
ing an Establishment Clause violation could possibly qualify as compelling. See Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981). However, that defense was not available to the state in Locke,
where both parties and all the Justices agreed that the program did not raise Establishment
Clause concerns. See supra notes 159-160.
182. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1315.
183. Id. at 1312.
184. Id.
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to review a subsidy law that facially implicates religion. 185 The tradi-
tion within Free Exercise Clause doctrine that provides for lesser scru-
tiny is best evidenced by language in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association:186 The crucial word in the constitu-
tional text is "prohibit": "For the Free Exercise Clause is written in
terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in
terms of what the individual can exact from the government."'1 87
This language, however, provides no support for Chief Justice
Rehnquist's position because it refers to the lesser scrutiny that the
Court now applies to laws that have only the incidental effect of bur-
dening religion. 188 Such minimal scrutiny has never been held to ap-
ply in cases where the law at issue facially discriminates on the basis of
religion.1 89 As Justice Scalia indicated in dissent, that line of cases
does not apply to Locke, since "[d]iscrimination on the face of a statute
is something else."' 90 In any event, Chief Justice Rehnquist's ap-
proach was an unexplained departure from prior Free Exercise Clause
precedent, and one that can only be justified by going beyond estab-
lished free exercise case law and analogizing to the Court's Free
Speech Clause jurisprudence.1 91
185. As Justice Scalia wrote in dissent, "The Court offers no authority for approving facial
discrimination against religion simply because its material consequences are not severe." Locke,
124 S. Ct. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). The Lyng Court contemplated whether the Free Exercise Clause
prohibited the government from allowing harvesting on national forest land that American In-
dian tribes traditionally used for religious purposes. Id. at 441. The Court held that it did not,
because the program was neutral, had only an incidental effect on the tribes' religious practice,
and had no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs. Id. at
450-51.
187. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963)).
188. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (declaring that "it is a permissi-
ble reading of the text to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion.., is not the object of the
tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the
First Amendment has not been offended").
189. See id. at 886; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546; McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 645.
190. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. Chief Justice Rehnquist departed from the Court's standard application of strict scrutiny
to laws that implicated religion on their face. See supra note 164. This departure can only be
explained by resort to free speech case law because the logical cornerstone of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion-the declaration that the "State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct
category of instruction"-comes directly from free speech case law. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313;
see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (holding that the government can, without
violating the Constitution, choose to fund one activity to the exclusion of another); Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (holding that the government
can, without violating the Constitution, choose not to pay for lobbying).
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3. Looking to Free Speech Jurisprudence for Guidance'92
Locke v. Davey is not a free speech case. Initially, Davey brought a
free speech claim against the state of Washington, but the district
court rejected that argument. 93 Even though the free speech claim
was not before the Supreme Court, the Court explicitly clarified in a
footnote that it would not analyze school subsidy programs under the
Free Speech Clause, since the purpose of giving scholarships to pri-
vate schools is generally to promote education and not to facilitate
private speech.1 94 Nonetheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion implicitly relies on certain free speech subsidy cases to reach
its result, as discussed below.195
The fulcrum of the Locke majority's analysis is that the Washington
statute does not infringe upon Davey's free exercise rights because the
"State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruc-
tion. 1 96 Chief Justice Rehnquist cites no authority for that proposi-
tion,197 as no prior free exercise case employed such reasoning.198 The
lack of citation by the Chief Justice is particularly conspicuous in light
of the Ninth Circuit's extensive treatment of these free speech subsidy
192. Rights protected by the Free Exercise Clause are intimately related to rights protected by
the Free Speech Clause. Indeed, Professor Mark Tushnet suggests that "contemporary
constitutional doctrine may render the Free Exercise Clause redundant." Mark Tushnet, The
Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 Lov. U. Cm. L.J. 71, 73 (2001). Professor Tushnet
contends that the protection the Free Exercise Clause provides today is also afforded by the First
Amendment rights to free speech and free association.
193. Davey v. Locke, No. COO-61R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *20 (W.D. Wash., Oct. 5,
2000) (indicating that "[tihe purpose of the Scholarship was not to subsidize student speech or to
invite expression of a diversity of viewpoints, but simply to pay for educational expenses").
194. See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313 (noting that "[tihe purpose of the Promise Scholarship
Program is to assist students from low- and middle-income families with the cost of postsecon-
dary education, not to 'encourage a diversity of views from private speakers."' (quoting United
States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003))).
195. Chief Justice Rehnquist incorporated the reasoning of free speech cases such as Regan,
Rust, and Finley. See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313. The Court often encounters and contemplates
the separate clauses of the First Amendment in conjunction with one another. See Rosemary C.
Salomone, Public Forum Doctrine and the Perils of Categorical Thinking: Lessons From Lamb's
Chapel, 24 N.M. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (discussing how, due to a proliferation of religion and
speech claims, "courts have wound through a maze of First Amendment doctrine over the past
two decades against the backdrop of a Supreme Court in ideological flux. The Religion and Free
Speech Clauses have generated sharp interpretive disagreements among Supreme Court
Justices.").
196. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313. The district court came to the same conclusion, noting that,
"[lhike each of his other constitutional arguments, Davey's reliance on McDaniel mistakenly
presumes that he has a right to have Washington fund his religious instruction. He does not
.... .Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *16.
197. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313.
198. The Lyng Court employed this reasoning, but in an inapplicable context. See supra notes
186-189 and accompanying text.
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cases in its Davey opinion.199 Regardless, the Chief Justice's Locke
argument tracks language used in a series of free speech subsidy cases
beginning with the abortion funding decisions.
200
Representative of the abortion funding cases is Rust v. Sullivan,
201
where the Court upheld regulations limiting the ability of federal
funding recipients to engage in abortion-related activities, such as
counseling.202 In Rust, the condition the government placed on the
dispersal of funds affected only the speech of government employees
working within the program created by the subsidy. The Court itself
later interpreted the Rust rationale as applying only to cases involving
"governmental speech," so that "viewpoint-based funding decisions
can be sustained in instances in which the government itself is the
speaker, . . . or instances, like Rust, in which the government used
private speakers to transmit information pertaining to its own pro-
gram. ' '203 Since the government disbursed public funds to create the
Title X program, the government can permissibly take reasonable
steps to control the dissemination of its desired message.
20 4
Rust cannot be convincingly compared to Locke. In Locke, the con-
dition placed on the dispersal of funds affected the activities of indi-
viduals within the scope of the government program, but none of
those individuals were government employees or working in further-
ance of a government purpose. 20 5 In the school subsidy situation,
there is no nexus between the dispersal of funds by the government
and the ultimate use of those funds by individuals. 20 6 In upholding the
Scholarship Program as one of "true private choice," the Zelman
Court found crucial the emphasis in previous Establishment Clause
cases that aid recipients were "empowered to direct the aid to schools
or institutions of their own choosing. ' 20 7 Since those acting under the
199. Davey, 299 F.3d at 752.
200. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
201. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
202. Id. at 178.
203. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001).
204. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
205. Instead, the affected individuals in Locke were the students.
206. The Zelman Court held that the channeling of funds through private individuals ends the
government's involvement for purposes of an Establishment Clause analysis: The incidental ad-
vancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reason-
ably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the
disbursement of benefits. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652. See also infra note 238 and accompanying
text.
207. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 651.
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government program are not government actors,208 the rationale from
Rust cannot apply.
The other seminal free speech subsidy case is Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Washington.20 9 Like Rust, Regan addresses the gov-
ernment's decision not to fund a category of speech.210 The law evi-
denced Congress's choice to grant tax deductions for contributions
made to veterans' groups that engage in lobbying, while denying that
favorable status to other groups pursuing lobbying efforts.211 Unlike
Rust, however, Regan did not concern the government in its role as
speaker. The governmental distinction in Regan was based on the sta-
tus of the speakers-veterans organizations as opposed to all others-
and not a distinction based on the content or message of those groups'
speech. 21 2 As such, the government was appropriating funds to fur-
ther its own policy, and the "legislature's decision not to subsidize the
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right." 21 3
Together, Rust and Regan represent the proposition that the gov-
ernment may selectively appropriate funds to advance its own poli-
cies. 2 14 As the Court later explained, "we have permitted the
government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed
when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its
own message. ' 215 Using this approach, the Court applies strict or in-
termediate scrutiny if it finds that the condition placed on the subsidy
operates as a penalty on speech, and alternatively applies rational ba-
sis review if it finds that there is no such penalty. Rust demonstrates
the deference the Court will give to government speech.216
Regan and Locke are not cases involving government speech, but
the Court chose in both instances to defer to the governmental sub-
208. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public
Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on "Equal Access" for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 653, 716 (1997) (stating that "[p]rivate schools redeeming vouchers are not
• . . receiving 'state money' . . . . A necessary premise of the constitutional validity of such
arrangements is that schools whose students bring government-provided financial assistance,
made available on a religion-neutral basis, have not lost one iota of their private capacity.").
209. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
210. In Rust, the government chose not to fund abortion counseling. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
In Regan, the government chose not to fund (through tax exemptions) the lobbying activities of
non-profit groups. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 544 (acknowledging that a "tax exemption has much
the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on
its income").
211. Regan, 461 U.S. at 546.
212. Id. at 548.
213. Id. at 549.
214. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001).
215. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
216. Rust, 500 U.S. at 187.
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sidy decision.21 7 The Regan decision, then, seemingly provides some
precedent for the Court's decision in Locke.218 Essentially, the Regan
decision reveals that the Court will allow the government more lati-
tude in restricting conduct through the dispersal of funds than by out-
right regulation. In his majority opinion in Locke, Chief Justice
Rehnquist used a similar analysis. He derived this principle from Free
Speech Clause case law,219 and concluded that the principle should
have a counterpart within Free Exercise Clause case law.22
0
This conclusion is consistent with the language of the First Amend-
ment. The Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause are
structurally identical, with the former reading, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . .. 221 and the latter reading, "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech. ' 222 Both are negative by
their terms-they limit the actions that government may take against
the rights of its citizens.223 It appears that no violation can arise under
the text of the Amendment until the government somehow diminishes
or restricts the respective constitutional right. As such, there should
be a principle within Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence comparable
to that expressed in Free Speech Clause jurisprudence, whereby the
law of public subsidies is more permissive than the law of
regulation.224
Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized the constitutional mandate for
such consistency, and his Locke opinion marked a step in that direc-
tion.225 His analysis ultimately missed the mark, however, because he
217. Regan, 461 U.S. at 550; Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313.
218. Regan is an example of the deferential treatment the Court gives to subsidy programs.
Regan, 461 U.S. at 550. However, it is not analogous to Locke because the case did not involve
viewpoint discrimination.
219. See supra notes 201-216.
220. This conclusion explains Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning that the "State has merely
chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction," in a Free Exercise Clause case. See Locke,
124 S. Ct. at 1313.
221. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
222. Id.
223. See Gerald MacCallum, Negative and Positive Freedom, in LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND
OTHER ESSAYS ON LAW, POLITICS, AND MORALITY 85 (Marcus G. Singer & Rex Martin eds.,
1993).
224. The difference between the two clauses in relation to the provision of subsidies, of
course, is that the Constitution provides a counterbalance, namely the Establishment Clause, to
the Free Exercise Clause, while the same is not true for the Free Speech Clause. Brian J. Serr, A
Not-So-Neutral "Neutrality:" An Essay on the State of the Religion Clauses on the Brink of the
Third Millennium, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 319, 337 (1999). The public forum analysis described
below, however, provides for this difference. See infra notes 268-272 and accompanying text.
225. Locke aligned free exercise subsidy law with the generally deferential approach the
Court takes in free speech subsidy law.
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did not consider all of the free speech subsidy cases in comparison to
Locke.2 26 Although Locke is decidedly not a free speech case, and
such cases did not control its outcome, a full review of free speech
subsidy case law is imperative to understanding the relationship be-
tween school subsidy programs and the Free Exercise Clause.2 27
B. An Alternative Approach: Constructing a Free Exercise Concept
Equivalent to the Free Speech Public Forum228
Instead of Rust and Regan, the free speech subsidy cases most ger-
mane to the facts presented in Locke are the public forum deci-
sions.229 Again, the Locke majority found that the school subsidy
program did not establish a public forum because the "purpose of the
Promise Scholarship Program is to assist students from low and mid-
dle-income families with the cost of postsecondary education, not to
"'encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.'"230 Still, the
Court has previously indicated that the limited public forum cases are
instructive in subsidy cases. 231 The purpose here is not to say that the
public forum cases control Locke,232 but rather to determine whether
226. In Locke, the Court did not account for the principle in free speech law wherein the
Court will more closely scrutinize governmental decision making involving the provision of sub-
sidies when it includes viewpoint discrimination. See supra notes 56, 86, and 94 and accompany-
ing text.
227. Such an analysis is imperative because the free speech subsidy cases that Chief Justice
Rehnquist failed to consider adequately, namely Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel, are those that
recognize the long-established free speech principle that governmental viewpoint discrimination
must be strictly scrutinized, even when it occurs in conjunction with the provision of subsidies.
See supra notes 56, 86, and 94 and accompanying text.
228. At least one scholar has analyzed the Court's application of the public forum concept to
religious speech in the context of public schooling. See generally Salomone, supra note 195.
Professor Salomone criticizes the Court's use of the public forum doctrine and advocates a more
fact-sensitive approach for addressing the right to use public property for private expression. See
id. at 26. However, the article addresses the public forum doctrine only as it operates in the free
speech arena; Professor Salomone does not suggest the construction of an equivalent
constitutional principle in the free exercise arena.
229. For purposes of this Note, the two most relevant decisions are Rosenberger and Lamb's
Chapel. See supra notes 56, 86, and 94 and accompanying text.
230. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313 (quoting United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 206
(2003)).
231. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 544 (stating "[a]s this suit involves a subsidy, limited forum cases
such as Perry, Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger may not be controlling in a strict sense, yet they
do provide some instruction").
232. See Davey, 299 F.3d at 755. The Court used a public forum analysis because
[w]e do not believe Rosenberger can be distinguished so readily. While the funding in
Rosenberger did involve student publications (except for religious publications), fund-
ing students' education (except for students pursuing religious education) is not much
different. Expressive conduct, creative inquiry, and the free exchange of ideas are what
the educational enterprise is all about. So is pursuing a course of study of one's own
choice.
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the free speech public forum cases contribute to our understanding of
the relationship between school subsidies and the Free Exercise
Clause, and whether a concept equivalent to the free speech public
forum framework can operate effectively within Free Exercise Clause
case law. Two public forum decisions are highly relevant for this
purpose.
The first pertinent case, Rosenberger,233 does not control the out-
come in Locke.234 Although the condition in Rosenberger implicated
religion, 235 the Court officially decided the case on free speech instead
of free exercise grounds. Since the Locke Court could not have ar-
gued persuasively that Washington state was "expend[ing] funds to
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers" 236 in creating its
school subsidy program, the state arguably did not open a limited pub-
lic forum. It is, however, possible to extend the public forum concept
beyond the boundaries of the Free Speech Clause. Whereas the state
establishes a public forum under the Free Speech Clause to facilitate
private speech within the confines of the subsidized program, an
equivalent concept under the Free Exercise Clause would apply to
those instances in which the government facilitates private action
within the confines of the subsidized program.
In Locke, for instance, the state's purpose in creating the Promise
Scholarship Program was "simply to pay for educational expenses. 237
In doing so, the state facilitated private action within the program by
allowing individual recipients of the scholarship to apply the funds to-
ward the educational pursuit of their choice. Indeed, the Zelman
Court held that school subsidy programs could only be constitutional
if they were "programs of true private choice, in which government
aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and inde-
pendent choices of private individuals. '238 Thus, Washington's Prom-
ise Scholarship Program facilitates private action, namely the pursuit
of a degree in higher education, within the confines of the subsidized
program.239
Id.
233. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
234. But see Brief for Respondent at 35, Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004) (No. 02-1315).
235. In Rosenberger, the state allowed for the payment of printing costs for various student
publications, but denied payment for one group whose paper "primarily promote[d] or mani-
fest[ed] a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
823.
236. Id. at 834.
237. Davey v. Locke, No. COO-61R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *20 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5,
2000).
238. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649.
239. See Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *20.
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Once the government opens a public forum, the necessities of re-stricting the forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which itwas created may justify the government in limiting access to the forumto particular groups or for the discussion of particular topics. 24o Thegovernment may not exclude a certain class of speech on a basis that isnot "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum."241 TheCourt will draw a distinction between subject matter discrimination,
"which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limitedforum," and viewpoint discrimination, "which is presumed impermis-sible when directed 
-against speech otherwise within the forum'slimitations. "242
By incorporating these principles into a conceptual equivalentunder the Free Exercise Clause, one can construct a framework fordetermining when the governmental exclusion of religion would vio-late the Free Exercise Clause. The government may limit participa-tion in the subsidized program to appropriate individual actions,consistent with the program's overall policy. However, the exclusionby the government of particular individual actions within the govern-ment-funded program must be reasonable in light of the purposeserved by the program.2 43 The purpose of Washington's PromiseScholarship Program was "'to help ease the financial burden' of 'thecosts associated with college.' "244 It is difficult to see how drawing adistinction between undergraduate majors generally and an under-graduate major in devotional theology could reasonably further thestate interest in making the cost of college education more
affordable.245
Even assuming arguendo that the law's distinction was reasonablein light of the purpose the program was designed to serve, the lawwould still be presumptively unconstitutional, as discussed below.Under the free speech public forum analysis, the government's dis-tinction must not constitute viewpoint discrimination.246 The Courthas acknowledged that the distinction between content and viewpoint
240. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc.,473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
241. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804-06.
242. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.243. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (stating that "[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forumcan be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reason-able in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral").244. Brief for Respondent at *2, Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004) (No. 02-1315).245. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.246. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830; see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n.,460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
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discrimination "is not a precise one. ' 247 As public forums in free
speech case law must be viewpoint neutral, any analogous concept
under the Free Exercise Clause would necessarily demand neutrality
with regard to religion. A discussion of certain free speech public fo-
rum cases illustrates the relationship between religion and this content
discrimination-viewpoint discrimination dichotomy. 248
The case which addresses this issue most directly is Lamb's
Chapel.249 There, the Court held that the exclusion of a church from
using public school facilities constituted viewpoint discrimination be-
cause the church was denied access solely for the reason that "the
presentation would have been from a religious perspective. ' 25 0 The
film series251 addressed a subject that was otherwise permissible,
namely family issues, but the school board chose to exclude it because
it addressed that issue from a religious perspective. 252 The Court
found this to be viewpoint discrimination and, therefore, had to be
justified by a compelling state interest.25 3 As in Lamb's Chapel, the
Court in Rosenberger found that the governmental distinction consti-
tuted viewpoint discrimination. 254 In Rosenberger, the very terms of
the university prohibition
[did] not exclude religion as a subject matter but select[ed] for disfa-
vored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious edi-
torial viewpoints. Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also
provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a stand-
point from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and consid-
ered. The prohibited perspective, not the general subject matter,
resulted .... 255
in the University's decision to withhold funding. In that respect, the
government action constituted viewpoint discrimination, not content
discrimination, and the state therefore needed to justify its restriction
with a compelling state interest.256
247. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831. Justice Kennedy went on to note that religious thought and
discussion constituted a viewpoint, even though, in his opinion, the formulation was "something
of an understatement" and would be better understood as "a comprehensive body of thought."
Id.
248. Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel represent the Court's fundamentally different approach
to governmental decisionmaking within the subsidy context when it involves discrimination
against religious viewpoints.
249. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
250. Id. at 393-94.
251. See supra note 89.
252. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394.
253. Id.
254. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 838.
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The definition of religious viewpoint discrimination that the Court
developed in Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel is essential to establish-
ing whether the Washington Promise Scholarship Program violated
the Free Exercise Clause. The free speech public forum cases permit
state-sponsored subject matter discrimination, since the government
creating the forum must have the ability to limit the forum's scope.257
These cases, however, do not allow the government to engage in view-
point discrimination where the government provides a forum for dis-
cussion of a given subject matter except from a particular
perspective.258 The restrictions placed by the government on religious
groups in both Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger facilitated the general
discussion of a given subject, but excluded any deliberation on that
subject from a religious viewpoint. 259
In Locke, Washington did not exclude religion as a "general subject
matter, ' 260 which would qualify as content discrimination. On the
contrary, as Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "the entirety of the Prom-
ise Scholarship Program goes a long way toward including religion in
its benefits. ' 26t Under the program, the state permitted students to
attend pervasively religious schools, if accredited by the state, as well
as to take devotional theology courses. Rather, the program disquali-
fied from eligibility only those students who pursued majors in theol-
ogy that were "devotional in nature or designed to induce religious
faith. ' 262 As in Lamb's Chapel, there was no indication that a student
would have been excluded from eligibility "for any reason other than
the fact that the [major] would have been [taught] from a religious
perspective. '263 The program, designed "simply to pay for educa-
257. Id. at 829 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985)). See also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (clarifying that the government may not exclude a
certain class of speech on a basis that is not "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum").
258. For instance, the state may provide space in a public library to citizens for an open dis-
cussion at a certain time. It could reasonably limit the subject matter to be discussed. The state
could hold a "family issues" discussion section at 8:00 p.m. on Wednesday nights. That would
constitute subject matter discrimination and would be permissible. The state could not, how-
ever, hold a "family issues" discussion section at that time, but exclude those citizens who wished
to speak on that topic from a religious perspective. The reason is that doing so would constitute
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
259. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
260. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
261. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1314.
262. Id. at 1310.
263. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94. Of course, a student could have been excluded from
eligibility for not meeting the academic, income, and enrollment requirements. These restric-
tions, however, are reasonable in light of the program's purpose.
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tional expenses,' 264 had an incredibly broad scope in regard to subject
matter-students could apply the scholarships to any intellectual pur-
suit within higher education, apart from a course of studies in devo-
tional theology. The Court's standard for the neutral treatment of
religion, introduced in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger, demands
that, when the government opens up a program to encourage such a
broad scope of private actions,265 it cannot then enact a viewpoint-
discriminatory restriction to limit individuals's private actions.2 66
In both Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger, the Court applied strict
scrutiny, explaining that it would uphold viewpoint-discriminatory re-
strictions if the government could demonstrate that it had a compel-
ling state interest.267 In both cases, the respective states argued that
their compelling state interest was the separation of church and state
and, in both cases, the Court found the argument unpersuasive. 268 Es-
pecially now, in the wake of Zelman, this argument fails, as Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist indicated in Locke:
Under our Establishment Clause precedent, the link between gov-
ernment funds and religious training is broken by the independent
and private choice of recipients. As such, there is no doubt that the
State could, consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit Prom-
ise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology and the State
does not contend otherwise.269
Justice Scalia agreed in dissent, saying, "[t]he establishment question
would not even be close.'' 270 Although "a State has a compelling state
interest in not committing actual Establishment Clause violations,"
the Court has "never inferred from this principle that a state has a
constitutionally sufficient interest in discriminating against religion in
whatever other context it pleases, so long as it claims some connec-
tion, however attenuated, to establishment concerns. '27 1 Therefore,
264. Davey v. Locke, No. COO-61R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *20 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5,
2000).
265. In short, the state funds a wide range of private actions-"training for all secular profes-
sions"-but excludes one category of private action-"training for religious professions."
Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313.
266. See also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001) (reasserting that
"speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public fo-
rum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint").
267. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839.
268. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845 (concluding that "[t]o obey the Establishment Clause, it was
not necessary for the University to deny eligibility to student publications because of their view-
point"); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 (disposing of the Establishment Clause defense "on the
ground that the posited fears of an Establishment Clause violation are unfounded").
269. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311-12 (internal citation omitted).
270. Id. at 1317 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 1318.
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in Locke, the Establishment Clause defense would not suffice to jus-
tify the law because the state had no compelling interest in separating
church and state in the context of a school subsidy program that chan-
nels funding through the independent choices of scholarship recipi-
ents.272 As a result, the state would have no justification for its action
and the viewpoint discrimination could not stand.
By analyzing Locke within a framework comparable to that of the
free speech public forum cases, it becomes clear that the result
reached by Justice Scalia is correct as a matter of constitutional consis-
tency.273 His decision fully aligned free exercise with free speech ju-
risprudence with respect to the provision of subsidies.2 74 Justice Scalia
recognized the general deference that the Court gives to governmen-
tal decisionmaking, but also incorporated the heightened scrutiny that
the Court applied to viewpoint discrimination in the subsidy con-
text.275 In fact, although Justice Scalia was careful not to cite any free
speech case law or to analogize to the public forum decisions, the rea-
soning he employed in his dissenting opinion translated the free
speech public forum analysis into free exercise terms.2 76
First, Washington State created a program to facilitate private ac-
tion toward making college education more affordable for its citizens.
Justice Scalia described this as "a generally available public benefit,
whose receipt is conditioned only on academic performance, income,
and attendance at an accredited school. ' 277 Under free speech public
forum analysis, then, the state may limit the program in ways that are
reasonable in light of the program's general purpose.278 Justice Scalia
conceded as much, saying that Washington "could make the scholar-
ships redeemable only at public universities (where it sets the curricu-
lum), or only for select courses of study. Either option would replace
a program that facially discriminates against religion with one that just
happens not to subsidize it.' '279 The fact that Washington "has then
carved out a solitary course of study for exclusion: theology" 280 is not
reasonable in light of the general purpose of attempting to make the
272. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649. The Court stated: "Three times we have confronted Estab-
lishment Clause challenges to neutral government programs that provide aid directly to a broad
class of individuals, who, in turn, direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of their choos-
ing. Three times we have rejected such challenges." Id.
273. See supra notes 221-224 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 225.
275. See supra notes 249-266 and accompanying text.
276. See generally Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 831; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 385.
277. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1316.
278. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.
279. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1317.
280. Id. at 1316.
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cost of college education more affordable for the state's citizens. The
difference between theology and any other major, then, has no bear-
ing on the cost of college education; there is no causal relationship
between the limitation on, and the purpose of, the program. 281
Second, under the public forum analysis, the state can limit individ-
ual action within the program by using content-based distinctions, but
not by using viewpoint-based distinctions. 282 Justice Scalia explained
that the statute was facially viewpoint-discriminatory, as "[n]o field of
study but religion is singled out for disfavor in this fashion. '2 83 In his
terms, the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination translated into
a principle mandating governmental neutrality between religion and
non-religion.284 Justice Scalia illustrated that Davey "seeks only equal
treatment-the right to direct his scholarship to his chosen course of
study, a right every other Promise Scholar enjoys. '285 His understand-
ing of the First Amendment compelled as much: "If the Religion
Clauses demand neutrality, we must enforce them, in hard cases as
well as easy ones. '2 86 This understanding of the Free Exercise Clause
comports with the principle, enunciated in Lamb's Chapel and Rosen-
berger, that governmental exclusion of religion constitutes viewpoint
discrimination. 287 Although Justice Scalia's dissent substantially com-
ports with public forum analysis,288 he failed to cite to any of the free
speech public forum cases, with the result that he left many of his
strongest arguments without authority.289
In all likelihood, this omission reveals Justice Scalia's reluctance,
discussed below, to expand public forum analysis beyond its current
boundaries. In at least one case, Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,
Justice Scalia's dissent expressed his narrow interpretation of the pub-
lic forum doctrine.290 There, he found that the act did not create a
281. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("No field of study but religion is singled out for disfavor in
this fashion.").
282. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
283. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1316.
284. Id. at 1317 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Religion Clauses demand neutrality").
285. Id. at 1316 (emphasis omitted).
286. Id. at 1317. The neutrality approach rests on the idea that the religion clauses of the First
Amendment are meant primarily to promote religious liberty, rather than to protect a division
between church and state. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup.
CT. REV. 1, 15.
287. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 276-286 and accompanying text.
289. The argument most conspicuous for its lack of authority is Justice Scalia's contention that
"[w]hen the State makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit becomes part of the
baseline against which burdens on religion are measured." Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1316 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
290. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 549-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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public forum because, "[flar from encouraging a diversity of views, it
has always . . . 'placed restrictions on its use of funds."' 291 In that
opinion, he also re-articulated the approach to free speech subsidy
cases that he had previously developed in his National Endowment for
the Arts v. Finley concurrence. 292 In that case, the Court upheld a
statutory provision that required the NEA to "consider[] general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of
the American public" in determining which projects should receive
federal funding.293 An examination of that concurrence in relation to
Locke demonstrates that, like Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia is
inconsistent in applying his approach to the First Amendment and the
provision of subsidies. 294
In his Finley concurrence, Justice Scalia found that the restriction
constituted both content and viewpoint discrimination.295 Neverthe-
less, he found the restriction constitutional because, in his interpreta-
tion, subsidy schemes do not implicate First Amendment rights. 296
Justice Scalia argued that a textualist reading of the First Amendment
does not allow for protection from viewpoint discrimination in the
provision of subsidies. 297 As the language of the Amendment reads
that "'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech,"' 298 he argued, the governmental choice to deny a subsidy
never raises First Amendment concerns because such a denial does
not "abridge" 299 the freedom of speech. In that particular case, then,
"those who wish to create indecent and disrespectful art are as uncon-
strained now as they were before the enactment of this statute. '' 3°°
He later clarified that the denial of subsidies could indirectly abridge
speech, but only if the funding scheme is "manipulated" to have a
"coercive effect" on those who do not hold the subsidized position.30 1
291. Id. at 553 (citations omitted).
292. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
293. Finley, 524 U.S. at 580.
294. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 590-600 (Scalia, J., concurring); but see Locke, 124 S. Ct. at
1315-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
295. Finley, 524 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that the provision "establishes
content- and viewpoint-based criteria upon which grant applications are to be evaluated. And
that is perfectly constitutional.").
296. Id. at 595-96.
297. Id. at 599.
298. Id. at 595 (citing U.S. CoNsT. amend. I).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587 (quoting Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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As such, Justice Scalia has in the past advocated minimum rational-
ity review for government subsidy programs that facially implicate
free speech rights, absent some coercion that would rise to the level of
actual "abridgment" of speech.30 2 Contrasting this position with the
result he reached in Locke reveals the inconsistency: Justice Scalia
would apply strict scrutiny to government subsidy programs that
facially implicate free exercise rights and minimum rationality review
to government subsidy programs that facially implicate free speech
rights. 30 3 To achieve consistency, Justice Scalia would have to apply
minimum rationality review to government subsidy programs that im-
plicate free exercise rights, absent a showing of coercion that would
rise to the level of an actual "prohibition" of religion. 30 4 At this point
his reasoning in Locke unraveled, as he advanced no viable argument
that the Washington statute coerced Davey into abandoning his relig-
ion. Justice Scalia argued:
Even if there were some threshold quantum-of-harm requirement,
surely Davey has satisfied it. The First Amendment, after all, guar-
antees free exercise of religion, and when the State exacts a financial
penalty of almost $3,000 for religious exercise-whether by tax or by
forfeiture of an otherwise available benefit-religious practice is any-
thing but free.305
This line of reasoning, however, is indistinguishable from the argu-
ment Justice Scalia rejected in Finley, where he found no "abridg-
ment" of speech because the person remained free to engage in
speech, only absent government funding.30 6 Under this flawed analy-
sis, the same is true in Locke: there is no "prohibition" of free exercise
because the government merely chose not to fund Davey's pursued
course of study. The fact that in Locke Justice Scalia emphasized the
free in "free exercise" is as unpersuasive as the Court's emphasis on
the free in "free speech" in Finley.30 7 As demonstrated above,308 a
better solution to the inconsistency between the two bodies of case
law would be to fully incorporate the free speech public forum analy-
sis into an equivalent principle under the Free Exercise Clause.
302. Id. at 596 (citation omitted).
303. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1319 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
304. Finley, 524 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., concurring).
305. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1319 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
306. Finley, 524 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., concurring).
307. Id. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring).




The analysis applied by the Locke majority for understanding the
relationship between the Free Exercise Clause and the provision of
subsidies is much broader than the one advocated in this Note. The
Locke decision establishes a precedent that could be understood to
uphold any law that facially implicates the right to free exercise, so
long as the law establishes a subsidy program. The governing princi-
ple in the opinion-that Davey's free exercise rights had not been
"prohibited" 309
-could apply across the board in the subsidy context.
It is necessary to consider the ramifications that the holding could
have in other areas within the school subsidy context, particularly im-
plications for pervasively sectarian schools and school voucher pro-
grams that contain viewpoint discriminatory provisions.
A. The Viability of State Aid to Pervasively Sectarian Schools-
the Next Question for the Court to Answer?
After the Locke decision, the next logical issue for the Court to
answer is whether a state may give funds to schools that are overtly
religious in character. For instance, suppose a state created a gener-
ally available scholarship program similar in all respects to the one in
Washington, except that it prohibited the use of the scholarships at a
pervasively sectarian school, or any school that integrates religious
principles into all subjects taught at the school. Colorado recently en-
acted the nation's first college-level voucher program, and in doing so
prohibited "pervasively sectarian" schools from participating. 310
Under a public forum-like analysis, that law would be presumptively
unconstitutional because it excludes religion from the general subsidy
program in a way that constitutes viewpoint discrimination under
Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger.311 As in those cases, the state would
not have a compelling state interest to justify the exclusion because
there is no countervailing Establishment Clause concern.
Under the Locke decision's logic, the Court could determine that
the state merely decided not to fund a distinct category of schools, and
thus violated no free exercise rights. 312 Such a result, however, would
run contrary to the seemingly diminishing significance of the "perva-
309. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1317 n.1.
310. See Associated Press, Nation's First College Voucher Program OK'd (May 10, 2004),
http://www.cnn.com/20O4/EDUCATION/05/10/college.vouchers/index.html (explaining that,
under the program, "money can go to religious schools, as long as they are not 'pervasively
sectarian'").
311. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
312. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313.
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sively sectarian" factor in religion clause jurisprudence generally. 313
In a recent Establishment Clause case, Justice Thomas, writing for the
Court, indicated that such a factor is now of little or no import.
31 4
Thus, under the logic of Locke, the Court would allow states to treat
''pervasively sectarian" schools differently from other religious
schools under the Free Exercise Clause, even though the Court has
acknowledged that there is virtually no material difference between
the two types of schools under its Establishment Clause analysis.315 In
addition to impacting the constitutionality of state aid to pervasively
sectarian schools, the Locke decision imperils the free exercise of re-
ligion by allowing governments to include religious viewpoint discrim-
ination as part of subsidy programs. 31 6
B. Applying Locke to the Question Unanswered in Zelman
Well before the events of September 11th31 7 established religious
hatred as a topic of frequent discussion, the Ohio legislature consid-
ered the issue while establishing the Pilot Project Scholarship Program
(Scholarship Program), the state's school voucher system.318 In re-
sponse to the educational crisis319 in the Cleveland public schools, a
federal district court placed the entire school district under direct state
control in 1995.320 The legislature enacted the Scholarship Program,
among other initiatives, to remedy the educational crisis. 321 As a con-
dition of receiving state funding, however, participating schools could
not "teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of ... relig-
ion. '322 As was apparent from the text of the statute, the state hoped
313. The Court has used the term "pervasively sectarian" in reference to an institution whose
secular purposes and religious mission were inextricably intertwined. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589, 621 (1988) (internal citation omitted).
314. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 826 (2000). Justice Thomas declared that:
One of the dissent's factors deserves special mention: whether a school that receives aid
(or whose students receive aid) is pervasively sectarian. The dissent is correct that
there was a period when this factor mattered, particularly if the pervasively sectarian
school was a primary or secondary school. But that period is one that the Court should
regret, and it is thankfully long past.
Id.
315. Compare Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1319, with Bowen, 487 U.S. at 621.
316. See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion
"sustains a public benefit program that facially discriminates against religion").
317. See Serge Schmemann, U.S. Attacked; President Vows to Exact Punishment for 'Evil',
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
318. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002).
319. For more than a generation, the city's schools had been among the worst in the nation.
Id. at 644.
320. See Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
321. See generally id.
322. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(6) (West 2003)).
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to encourage the principle of religious inclusion among the participat-
ing schools.323
In its recent decision, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,324 the Supreme
Court upheld Ohio's Scholarship Program because it was a neutral
program of general applicability and channeled funds through an in-
termediary-namely, the children's parents. 325 The Court held that
Ohio's program did not offend the Establishment Clause.326 Dissent-
ing in Zelman, Justice David Souter presciently observed that the "ha-
tred" provision in the Ohio Scholarship Program carries with it the
possibility of discriminatory application that would raise First Amend-
ment concerns. 327 He suggested that the provision, "could be under-
stood (or subsequently broadened) to prohibit religions from teaching
traditionally legitimate articles of faith as to the error, sinfulness, or
ignorance of others, if they want government money for their
schools. ' 328 In the corresponding footnote, he cited to examples of
mainstream religious doctrines that could conceivably be interpreted
as constituting "hatred of any person or group on the basis of...
religion," 329 such as:
Christian New Testament (2 Corinthians 6:14) (King James Version)
("Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: for what
fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? and what com-
munion hath light with darkness?"); The Book of Mormons (2 Ne-
phi 9:24) ("And if they will not repent and believe in his name, and
be baptized in his name, and endure to the end, they must be
damned; for the Lord God, the Holy One of Israel, has spoken it");
Pentateuch (Deut. 29:19) (The New Jewish Publication Society
Translation) (for one who converts to another faith, "[t]he LORD
will never forgive him; rather will the LORD's anger and passion
rage against that man, till every sanction recorded in this book
comes down upon him, and the LORD blots out his name from
under heaven"); The Koran 334 (The Cow. Ch. 2:1) (N. Dawood
transl. 4th rev. ed. 1974) ("As for the unbelievers, whether you fore-
warn them or not, they will not have faith. Allah has set a seal upon
323. At least two scholars have found the same legislative purpose to be apparent: "the regu-
lation of messages of intolerance or hatred for religious ... groups is bound up with education
for citizenship in a liberal, inclusive democracy." Ira Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Zelman's Future:
Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 917, 979 (2003).
324. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
325. Id. at 663.
326. Id.
327. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 713-14 (Souter, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 713.
329. Id. (quoting OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(6) (West Supp. 2002)).
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their hearts and ears; their sight is dimmed and a grievous punish-
ment awaits them"). 330
Concededly, the school district superintendent has not to date denied
funding to any participating school, religious or otherwise, on the ba-
sis of the "hatred" provision, but it is indisputable that under the stat-
ute he has the authority to do so. 33 As Justice Souter suggests, a
superintendent may at some point utilize that authority to deny or
revoke the registration of a Christian, Mormon, Jewish, or Muslim
school, each of which could conceivably and not unreasonably be
deemed as a school that "teach[es] hatred of any person or group on
the basis of . . . religion. ' 332 The question that follows, then, is
whether an application of this provision to revoke funding would vio-
late the Free Exercise Clause.
The Free Exercise Clause generally prohibits governmental regula-
tion of religious beliefs.333 The Court has held that government may
neither compel affirmation by an individual of an adverse belief nor
discriminate against individuals because they hold religious views that
the government or majority disfavors.334 Fowler enunciated the prin-
ciple that government must restrain the impulse "to approve, disap-
prove, classify, regulate, or in any manner control" religious belief.
335
Central to the development of this doctrine has been the fundamental
distinction between belief and action. 336 As such, religious beliefs are
330. Id. at 713 n.24 (Souter, J., dissenting). Amici curiae made a similar point. See Brief of
Amici Curiae Council on Religious Freedom et al. at 28-29, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779) (noting that "[miany faith traditions teach some
form of exclusivity-that their religion is the only truth or is the best expression of truth and that
some other religions are wrong"). Scholars have made the same observation. See Aviam Soifer,
The Scholarship of Sanford Levinson: Secular Sectarianism, Perilous Neutrality, 38 TULSA L.
REV. 755, 765 (2003) (asserting that "the 'us' and 'them' of a good deal of religious belief may
blur into 'teaching hatred,' at least within the perception of a disgruntled student, parent, or
teacher or a taxpayer unsympathetic with the teachings of a particular religion").
331. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 713-14 (Souter, J., dissenting). "The state superintendent shall re-
voke the registration of any school if, after a hearing, the superintendent determines that the
school is in violation of any of the provisions of division (A) of this section." Id. (citing OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(B) (West 2003)).
332. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 713 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3313.976(A)(6) (West Supp. 2002)).
333. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940): Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
402 (1963); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
334. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
335. Fowler, 345 U.S. at 69-70.
336. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Of course, government can at times
prohibit conduct based on religion as well, if "[t]he conduct or actions so regulated have invaria-
bly posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
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immune from regulation, whereas action based on religious beliefs can
be reasonably regulated by the state.337
In the realm of religious belief cases, Ballard is the Court's seminal
decision. 338 There, the Court's language amounts to an almost abso-
lute preclusion of government participation in the sphere of the spiri-
tual. Indeed, the Court asserted that "[m]an's relation to his God was
made no concern of the state. He was granted the right to worship as
he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious
views. '339 If Ohio completely prohibited the teaching of "hatred of
any person or group on the basis of... religion," it would not involve
the performance of physical acts, but only the beliefs advanced by the
religions.340 As a result, the preclusion would be unconstitutional
under Ballard and its progeny because in application it would intrude
upon those religious beliefs.341
The Court's holding in Locke, however, suggests that states can
make such distinctions in their subsidy programs and avoid the reach
of the Free Exercise Clause. 342 Chief Justice Rehnquist attempted to
limit the scope of the majority's holding, writing "the only interest at
issue here is the State's interest in not funding the religious training of
clergy. Nothing in our opinion suggests that the State may justify any
interest that its 'philosophical preference' commands. ' 343 The argu-
ments that "[tihe State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct cate-
gory of instruction,"'344 and that no free exercise violation has arisen
because Davey's free exercise rights have not been "prohibited, ' 345
apply with equal force to any subsidy law that implicates free exercise
rights. Justice Scalia claimed that the majority's holding "has no logi-
cal limit and can justify the singling out of religion for exclusion from
public programs in virtually any context. '346 With the holding in.
Locke, the Court proved Justice Scalia correct by failing to provide a
limiting principle with which to discern the viability of myriad types of
governmental conditions within the school subsidy context. Appar-
337. See generally Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
338. See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text.
339. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
340. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 713 (Souter, J., dissenting).
341. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
342. See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313 (stating that "[tihe State has merely chosen not to fund a
distinct category of instruction").
343. Id. at 1314 n.5.
344. Id. at 1313.
345. Id. at 1314.
346. Id. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ently any such limit to the logic of the Locke decision will require
further development.
C. Resorting to the Establishment Clause as an
Alternative Approach
In Locke, the Court made clear that it would neither examine con-
ditions placed on school subsidy programs under the Free Speech
Clause, nor would it examine such conditions under the Free Exercise
Clause. 347 Only the Establishment Clause, then, remains for the
Court to use in scrutinizing such conditions. This is fitting, as the pro-
vision of subsidies has normally been the realm of Establishment
Clause analysis. 348
Differential treatment by government among religions raises Estab-
lishment Clause concerns.349 Generally, the Court has interpreted the
two religion clauses together to mean that "the state may neither
favor nor disfavor religion. A law targeting religious beliefs as such is
never permissible. '350 As the conditions in the Colorado and Ohio
statutes above are expressly directed at religious beliefs, they raise Es-
tablishment Clause concerns. Under the Establishment Clause, any
constitutional violation exists within the entitlement itself, extended to
one group but not the other. The Establishment Clause question is
whether the state, by creating these conditions, is coercing parents
into sending their children to certain religious schools over others.
This is similar to the question in Zelman of whether Ohio was coerc-
ing parents into sending their children to religious schools over non-
religious ones.351
Restrictions that the government includes in its subsidy program
could be used to create an Establishment Clause violation.
Lukumi,352 as well as earlier cases, 353 stands for the principle that a
statute may improperly discriminate against religion in its application
347. Id. at 1313-15.
348. Thomas McCoy & Gary Kurtz, A Unifying Theory for the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 249, 262 (1986) ("According to current doctrine that distin-
guishes between the two religion clauses, governmental benefits to religion are subject to chal-
lenge under the establishment clause."). See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
349. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
350. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 752 (9th Cir. 2002). Two commentators have acknowl-
edged that the two clauses should be read in conjunction. See McCoy & Kurtz, supra note 348,
at 256 (stating "the free exercise clause and the establishment clause should be read and applied
as a single conceptual unit, a single constitutional restriction on government").
351. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655-56.
352. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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as well as on its face. 354 These statutes could satisfy the coercion re-
quirement 355 necessary to violate the Establishment Clause if states
employed them in such a way as to purposefully discriminate against
one religion, or to favor certain religions.356 Moreover, any vague
standards in statutes or broad discretion granted to state officials, both
of which could facilitate an arbitrary application of the statute, would
also raise constitutional problems.357 For instance, in Zelman, the
Ohio Scholarship Program granted too much authority to the State
Superintendent to determine what constituted "hatred," thereby al-
lowing the state to intrude into matters of religious belief.358 It is pre-
cisely this type of government power, exercised in order to enshrine
certain religious beliefs over others, against which the Establishment
Clause was designed to protect.
V. CONCLUSION
As the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses are structural paral-
lels, 359 the constitutional text compels a jurisprudential consistency
between the two with respect to the provision of subsidies. Neverthe-
353. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
354. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 423 (1963). ("Those situations in which the Consti-
tution may require special treatment on account of religion are, in my view, few and far between,
and this view is amply supported by the course of constitutional litigation in this area." (citations
omitted)).
355. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604 (1992) ("Although our precedents make clear that
proof of government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation, it is
sufficient. Government pressure to participate in a religious activity is an obvious indication that
the government is endorsing or promoting religion.").
356. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951) (observing that "the use of the park
was denied because of the City Council's dislike for or disagreement with the Witnesses or their
views"); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953) (stating that "a religious service of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses is treated differently than a religious service of other sects. That amounts to the
state preferring some religious groups over this one.").
357. See Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 272. The officials were governed only by "an amorphous
'practice,' whereby all authority to grant permits for the use of the park is in the Park Commis-
sioner and the City Council. No standards appear anywhere; no narrowly drawn limitations; no
circumscribing of this absolute power." Id. at 271-72. See also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952). The Court invalidated on freedom of speech and freedom of the press
grounds a New York state statute that allowed for the banning of films that were found to be
"sacrilegious." Id. at 505-06. Justice Tom Clark stated that the application of the statute raised
the specter of constitutional problems of religion, as "the state has no legitimate interest in
protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them." Id. at 505. In practice, even "the
most careful and tolerant censor would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion
over another" when making decisions based on the broad standard "sacrilegious." Id.
358. See Brief of Amici Curiae Council on Religious Freedom et al. at 28-29, Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779) (asserting "[w]hat constitutes
teaching hate, of course, is very subjective and lends itself to biased judgments").
359. See supra notes 221-224 and accompanying text.
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less, there was a marked disconnect to that effect between the Court's
free exercise and free speech jurisprudence before the Locke v. Davey
decision. After Locke, the disconnect remains, albeit in different
form. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist attempted to
reconcile the two bodies of case law by implicitly incorporating the
reasoning of earlier free speech subsidy cases into a free exercise deci-
sion.360 However, by neglecting the cases most germane to the school
subsidy situation, the public forum cases, his attempt failed. 361 The
development under the Free Exercise Clause of a concept akin to the
free speech public forum analysis would bridge this jurisprudential
gap and bring consistency to the Court's treatment of the First
Amendment with respect to the provision of subsidies.
John P. Scully*
360. See supra notes 196-224 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 230-272 and accompanying text.
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